Remarks by H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister

of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the Symposium on

the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

Rome, 27 February 1999

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentleman;

It is a pleasure and an honor to participate in this important symposium to exchange views on a global issue that has a corrupting and debilitating effect on social and economic lives of every state, large and small, in our increasingly interdependent world. I shall not fail to give tribute to the United Nations Center for Drug Control and Crime Prevention and to the Government of Italy for organizing this timely Symposium, and for the leadership to narrow the gaps in national positions to develop an international standard for inter-state cooperation against transnational organized crime.

It is axiomatic that transnational organized crime is a global problem requiring a global response coupled with a global strategy for its implementation. My remarks focus on the opportunities and challenges faced by the United Nations to enlist the widest possible inter-state cooperation against transnational organized crime.

The fight against transnational organized crime can and must be pursued at national, bilateral, regional and international levels. All things considered, I will argue that the United Nations stands a better chance to develop an effective international approach to this problem; an approach that could potentially enlists the widest possible cooperation from the countries of the North and the South, on the one hand, and to avoid viewing the fight against transnational organized crime as a uni-sectoral issue.

The Draft United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime takes after the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Judging by the degree of interest and the large number of signatories, in a short period of time, to the latter, it would be safe to assume that the convention against organized crime, when elaborated, would receive an equally wide reception.

The draft UN Convention against Organized Crime intends to extend mechanisms envisaged in the UN drug convention to combat drug trafficking to all organized crimes yet to be defined. These mechanisms include:

1- Obligation by states parties to the Convention to adopt enabling domestic legislation that allows the seizure and forfeiture of proceeds derived from organized transnational crime and of property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or intended for use in an organized transnational crime as a means of fighting such crimes and the money laundering that is associated with predicate offences; and

2- Provisions for Mutual Legal Assistance and extradition which also reflect the importance of cooperation among states parties to the Convention as means to fight transnational organized crime.

The draft UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, like its predecessor, the UN drug convention, is a purely “law and order” instrument. As a primarily law enforcement tool, it can potentially be prejudicial to the sovereignty and the integrity of domestic legal systems of smaller or less developed countries. In this context, the question of the scope of application of the convention must be responsive to these concerns. The provisions in the draft convention on the imperative of respecting sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states and that of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states in the course of implementation of obligations under the Convention by all state parties are fundamentally important safeguards that need to be further highlighted. Under such circumstances, misgivings about the possibility of over zealous criminal justice practitioners to try to exercise some sort of jurisdiction in the territory of other states would be substantially removed.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentleman;

Elaboration and wide acceptance by states of any given United Nations convention is an arduous task. It has been most successful in cases where universal consensus were forged on the existence of the problem, its implications for different parties, as well as the global benefits and advantages of the methods envisaged to address the problem.

The elaboration of a draft Convention against Transnational Organized Crime is indeed an important endeavor seeking an international standard for inter-state cooperation to address a common and pressing problem; an endeavor which is quite commendable in and of itself. We need to remain cognizant of the fact, however, that the process has gained pace and is moving forward, primarily due to the initiative of a number of countries, mostly in the industrialized world, with the assistance and professionalism of UN staff at the Center for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in Vienna.

Furthermore, I would venture to say that the problem of selective enforcement of the law -- that we are all familiar with in our domestic legal systems -- has a greater probability of plaguing the United Nations Conventions for a variety of reasons. Elaboration and adoption of UN conventions is something, their implementation, particularly, their good-faith implementation is a wholly separate issue. This is a chronic challenge the United Nations faces.

In the context of the Draft UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the United Nations must address the following interlinked concerns in order to generate the widest possible political will on the part of the future parties to the convention to implement it.

First, as I have already pointed out, the Draft Convention in question and similar conventions have a “law and order“ approach, which can have a tendency for a uni-sectoral approach to a problem that requires a multi-disciplinary approach. The former focuses efforts only on legal and perhaps financial institutions to combat transnational organized crime. The latter requires that the “law and order” approach be an integral part of a broader scheme addressing economic, social, cultural and political development. The cause of this Draft Convention and others similar to it -- which intend to promote global cooperation in dealing with global problems -- will be best served when genuine progress is made on issues dealing with sustainable development, when the savage inequality between the countries of the North and the South is narrowed down and thereby a “human face” is put on a globalized economy, to borrow from the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Secondly, we have all referred to transnational organized crime as a “global” problem requiring a global solution. For our part, we in the Islamic Republic of Iran have had the experience of combating international criminal groups of narcotic traffickers for the last two decades. Thus for us it is only natural to accept that the problem is global in nature and scope and requires a global solution, with common but differentiated burden sharing.

But, the term “global” problem when referring to transnational organized crime needs some pondering. How “global” this problem really is? I suggest that there are many states members of the United Nations, particularly among the developing countries, that have had little, if any, experience with some or all forms of transnational organized crime. Or, even if they do, resource constraints and competing national concerns does not allow adoption of costly measures to counter them to secure a priority national agenda.

At the same time, there are states that adopt policies, like fiscal incentives or unyielding bank secrecy laws, that are potentially fertile ground to attract laundering operation of “dirty money”. The proceeds from narcotic trafficking alone, is estimated at more than 500 billion US dollar a year. There are states that compete to attract a portion of this huge sum as foreign capital investment. Therefore, the perception of threat by states of transnational organized crime is not evenly distributed. It is higher in the industrialized world, although, some are even perceived to stand to benefit from it.

The resources and the means available to effectively combat transnational organized crime is not evenly distributed either. It is by far lower in the developing countries. This is perhaps an immediate challenge before the international community to provide appropriately custom-made incentive to countries that are willing but incapable, for budgetary or other reasons, to become reliable partners in the fight against transnational organized crime, and disincentive to those who are reluctant to do so because of their perceived interests.

This last point brings me back to the primary role of the United Nations and what it must be enabled to do in respect of promoting inter-state cooperation for the implementation of a future convention against transnational organized crime. In our view, the role of the United Nations in this respect has not been fully explored.

In addition to the general and broad concerns I raised about the overall environment of international relations within which this Convention must operate and which the United Nations must be empowered to address, the role of the United Nations in providing tailored incentives for developing countries to become full partners in the fight against transnational organized crime must be specifically spelled out in the convention. These tailored incentives range from relevant development projects about improving the efficacy of the criminal justice system to the provision of technical assistance on various aspects of the convention and different phases of its implementation. These incentives will have financial implications, which, in our view, should be borne on the basis of common but differentiated burden sharing.

Strengthening and improving criminal justice systems including law enforcement and adjudication process in developing countries to a level that would be effective and fair in dealing with today’s sophisticated transnational organized crime -- and indeed those of the year 2000 and beyond -- is a formidable challenge due not only to limited resources available, but also to, in many cases, insufficient information and know-how available internally. Provision of technical assistance in the form of regular provision and exchange of information, training of criminal justice practitioners, and overall improvement of the technical capacities of the developing countries would undoubtedly alleviate the global effects of crime in general, and transnational organized crime, in particular. Therefore, by investing in the international programs in developing countries for technical assistance to improve their criminal justice capacities, developed countries have also served their own societies.

Multilateral assistance, when provided through the United Nations, is perceived as assistance with less political implications, as compared to those provided by developed countries to the developing countries on bilateral basis. Such legitimacy is an unparalleled advantage which the United Nations as the sole universal body enjoys. Other advantages of providing multilateral assistance through the United Nations include: its capacity for consensus-building, translating them into agreed international norms, integrating them, where appropriate, into national development plans and supporting them through the United Nations operational activities. Furthermore, the United Nations emphasizes bottom-up, country-driven programming of development assistance which would render them more effective.

Finally, the role of the United Nations system in the monitoring and evaluation of the convention, envisaged as an option in Article 23 of the draft, may be formulated in a manner that would not only provide for an effective monitoring mechanism, but in fact a participatory process of evaluation of obstacles allowing for better formulation of incentives and disincentives as the case may be.

Let me conclude by suggesting that we have no forum more universal, better equipped, better fit and more willing than the United Nations to tackle all major concerns in a manner that would secure the greatest possible convergence of views among nations. This can be done only when we, the member states, view the United Nations in a different light, not as an institutional extension of our individual national security policies, but a truly international organization that “we the peoples of the United Nations” established and are determined to employ “for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.”