STATEMENT BY

H.E. DR. M. JAVAD ZARIF

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

BEFORE

THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

New York, April 19, 1994

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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

Allow me at the outset to congratulate you on your well-deserved election to preside over this session of the Disarmament Commission. It is a great pleasure to see a diplomat of your status steering the work of this important forum in the United Nations disarmament machinery. In line with the primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the role of the Commission in examining various issues and challenges in the field of global and regional disarmament, in submitting recommendations and in promoting the implementation of relevant decisions of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is of great relevance. It is thus a source of satisfaction that the Disarmament Commission has taken steps in the last few years in order to improve its methodology and rationalize its work, enabling itself to deal more effectively and expeditiously with the challenges in this field.

We also note with satisfaction that the Commission succeeded last year in finalizing its work on "regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security". The document produced despite some shortcomings is of high value and significance, and can contribute substantively as a sound basis for our common efforts in this field.

Being located in a region, which has been the scene of aggressions, expansionist tendencies, destabilizing conflicts and rivalries, arms race, massive arms transfers and foreign military presence, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a genuine appreciation of the need for such regional approaches. We have, in the past several years, put forward a number of proposals and ideas in various international fora for the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in particular nuclear weapons in the Middle East, formation of security and cooperation arrangements in the Persian Gulf area, reduction of military expenditures including agreement on a ceiling for international arms purchases and transfers to each country in the area as well as the establishment of a forum in which concerns and suggestions of Persian Gulf states in the area of Security and armaments could be aired and debated.

My delegation also welcomes the inclusion of the new item on illicit arms trade on the agenda of the Commission. This issue, which has very direct and close links to international drug trafficking as well as terrorism, has had serious consequences for the security of a number of states across the globe. Like terrorism and the drug menace, illicit arms trade is an international problem, requiring solutions based on international cooperation, and a common approach. The Commission can thus play a very constructive role by establishing guidelines and pinpointing areas of mutual effort and cooperation.

Let me now turn to agenda items 4 & 6, which are due to be finalized in this session.

It is evident that the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security with the objective of elimination of nuclear weapons remains the most important priority in the field of disarmament.

It is also self evident that the most effective guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament, including destruction of all existing nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, the obvious fact that no non-proliferation scheme will succeed so long as nuclear disarmament is not clearly in perspective should not be overlooked.

On the other hand, with the cold-war now behind us, there remains no longer any justification, if there ever were any, to continue to maintain stockpiles of nuclear weapons, much less develop new ones.

Despite all this, discussions and negotiations continue to be centered around reduction of nuclear arsenals rather than their eradication. We have limited ourselves to praise and welcome the conclusion of INF, START I, and START II which are in themselves important and welcome achievements. We have even availed ourselves to discuss issues such as the likelihood of scenarios of conventional confrontations escalating to the use of nuclear weapons, which not only negates the objective of nuclear disarmament, but also runs counter to the very foundations of negative security assurances.

Thus, a sincere and deep review of reasons and justifications for persistence of nuclear armaments in the world is necessary. States that hold massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons have, at least, a moral obligation to explain to the international community as to what remains the logic behind maintaining nuclear weapons. The world has the right to know: who these weapons are intended for and who they are to deter any more.

It is quite shocking that no major country possessing nuclear weapons has come forward in this regard. At the same time, they seek unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, making it absolutely clear that even their ultimate goal remains non-proliferation rather than eradication of nuclear weapon.

Therefore, the nuclear-weapon states should make a solid commitment to destroy the entire stockpiles of their nuclear arsenal and their delivery systems within a time-bound framework. The minimum expected is a declaration of the intention to do so and the specification of a target date. This date should be finalized during the NPT Conference in 1995, when the Treaty comes up for review and possible extension. This, along with the conclusion of negotiation on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prior to 1995, would greatly enhance the chances of that Conference.

The 1995 Conference also provides an exceptional opportunity for strengthening the process of nuclear disarmament by redressing the imbalance in the treaty, which seem to have exempted the nuclear-weapon states, at least according to their own interpretation, from the prohibition on further manufacturing of nuclear weapons as well as the vertical proliferation. In this context, binding commitments on prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes can be incorporated into the NPT, which will also serve the purpose of resolution 48/75L adopted by the General Assembly on this subject by consensus.

A few other steps are also required in order to strengthen the process of nuclear disarmament through the NPT and allow its continued applicability and therefore extension.

Probably the most important and fundamental flaw in the international non-proliferation regime is the application of double standards which has led to selective proliferation of nuclear weapons. This has not only gravely undermined the authority and the relevance of the NPT, but also has had serious ramifications for international and regional peace and security, and has retarded regional initiatives. In our region, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel has foiled all efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, despite General Assembly's unanimous and continuous endorsement for the past two decades of the idea put forward originally by Iran in 1974.

Even worse, the threat posed by the refusal of Israel to join any international nuclear regime and to accept the NPT or IAEA safeguards, coupled with the pursuit of a discriminatory and dangerous policy of selective proliferation, rather than non-proliferation, by nuclear-weapon states have increased the potential for further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and have led to non-accession of some states to international instruments prohibiting weapons of mass destruction.

A related issue is the need for minimum incentive for compliance and a fair balance in the Treaty between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states to serve the interests of all state parties. Unfortunately, this was not fully realized at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty. Today, after elapse of more than two decades, the imbalances between the obligations and responsibilities have been widely aggravated. Even the existing provisions of Treaty have been implemented only selectively.

As a result, it can be reasonably argued that countries that have remained outside the Treaty have had their free-ride while those who have joined have been deprived of the minimum incentives; those related to peaceful use and to their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In the context of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, it is the primary right of non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT to be assured of non use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In discussing the extension of the NPT, it is imperative that nuclear weapon states extend the obligation undertaken by them in Tlatelolco and Raratonga Treaties to all states parties to the NPT.

In the meantime, the Conference on Disarmament should, intensify negotiations with a view to concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Similarly, based on the obligation undertaken under the Treaty, states renouncing the nuclear option through joining the NPT must be granted full access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, the relevant provisions of the Treaty have not been implemented, particularly, as regards the developing state-parties to the NPT. I will address this issue in broader terms under agenda item 6, to which I will now turn.

Today, a number of technologies, that have the potential to completely transform the methods of warfare, are in advanced stages of development. A new generation of sophisticated nuclear and conventional, non-lethal and brilliant weapons are under development, with destabilizing effects on the global security situation.

This requires a genuine and serious international effort to devise safeguard and monitoring mechanisms in order to ensure prohibition of further utilization of science and technology for developing new weapon systems. Advances in science and technology should be directed for utilization in the field of disarmament, and mainly for multilateral verification of disarmament agreements.

A related concern is ensuring that high technology is exclusively used for peaceful purposes. Many areas of science and technology with primary and vital applications in health, industry, agriculture and other civilian fields may also have possible military utility. This apparent apprehension has led some developed states to exercise unilateral and group export restrictions on transfer of material and technology to states who are parties to international disarmament instruments, most notably the NPT, CWC and BWC. This practice neglects the fact that the incentive for joining and compliance with these instruments is the assurance given to the have-nots to gain secure access to the related materials and technology for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the relation between science and technology and non-proliferation is obviously a common international concern, and thus the solution should also be an internationally negotiated one. Unilateral and private club restrictions, which are mostly arbitrary and politically motivated, simply exacerbate an atmosphere of suspicion.

In the area of nuclear technology, it has become absolutely evident that material and technologies related to peaceful use are intended to be denied to most NPT signatories, save a few, even outside the NPT, who fall in the category of political and military allies. Discrimination is the rule and not even the exception. Countries that do not have the best relations with some powerful nuclear states particularly suffer no matter how scrupulously they observe the provisions of the Treaty and the related safeguards. The discriminatory approach in implementation of the provisions related to peaceful use has even been formalized in creation of bodies outside the Treaty such as the London Club. In this respect, while there should be an understanding that countries who have chosen not to join the NPT in order to keep their option for access to nuclear weapons must be treated differently than those who made commitments, we need incentives for the have- nots and disincentives for the haves. The NPT should, thus, be extended in such a way that all countries would find it clearly in their interest to join. The incentive must include a binding commitment to what has already been provided for in the Treaty for the peaceful use by all contracting parties. Further, a mechanism must be set up to ensure that commitments related to peaceful use are realized and all discriminatory measures are lifted.

The same is true for the Australia Group in the field of chemical and biological materials and technology. Here the Australia Group was to remove limits and barriers on export of chemical materials perceived as having dual use, hence restricting limitations only to those agreed upon in the Convention after years of negotiations. The early indications are otherwise:

At the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Australia has proposed a model legislation which includes export control on chemicals beyond what is prescribed by the CWC. The intention, clearly, is to justify, and legalize through legislation, continuation of Australia Group.

Also, during the last General Assembly, the western countries refused inclusion of a phrase from the Convention concerning technological cooperation for peaceful use into their draft resolution even at the cost of its withdrawal.

There is already a growing concern, as the result, that the enthusiasm of many countries to sign the Convention will give way to reluctance or, at least, indifference when comes the time for ratification and implementation. With CWC coming into force, the export regime set forth by the Australia Group should be abandoned as it has been envisaged in Article XI of the Convention.

The arbitrary limitations on transfer of material and technology has also already had its negative effects on discussions to formulate verification mechanisms related to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Several months of discussion and work among the experts in the framework of the VEREX to produce ideas on verification ended with strong expressions of concern by developing and non-aligned countries. They rightfully stated, on the basis of past experience in NPT, CWC and other treaties, that they will not go along with an intrusive verification system as it may, once again, hamper development in the field of peaceful use in another very significant area. They seek, this time, real guarantees and commitments for removal of all restrictions as well as transfer of material and related technology by the producing countries before considering new verification system.

It would thus be appropriate for the Commission to complete its work on Agenda item 6 by agreeing on guidelines which would on the one hand ensure prohibition of further utilization of science and technology for the development of new weapon systems, and on the other, guarantee that restrictions on transfer of materials and technology would only be governed by internationally negotiated conventions and treaties, and in the absence of such treaties be fully transparent, non-discriminatory, and reduced to the minimum necessary level with the sole objective of enhancing international security at lower levels of armaments.