In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Good Morning ladies and gentlemen. I am delighted to be here today to share with you some thoughts about an issue which is extremely important to your country as well as mine. The current situation in the Persian Gulf presents a real threat to the international peace and security and has brought the United States to the brink of war thousands of miles away from its shores. While before the dispatch of the American and other Western forces to the Persian Gulf region the situation there was far from peaceful, it cannot be doubted that the massive Western military build-up in the region has exacerbated the already existing tensions and added to the possibility of escalation and major hostilities in the region. One does not have to be completely familiar with the situation to appreciate that by adding more than 70 foreign vessels of war to a crowded and less than friendly waterway, the possibilities of friction, even accidental ones, are bound to increase. Therefore, it is essential to have a clear understanding of the realities of the situation and examine in their light the policy of the United States.

I submit to you today that all in all, between what is claimed in public and what is more discreetly articulated, the American policy in the Persian Gulf claims to have 4 essential elements:

1. Maintaining freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf;

2. Bringing a cease-fire to the Iran-Iraq war;

3. Supporting American friends and allies in the Persian Gulf; and

4. Preventing increased Soviet presence.

The first three elements are directly related to my country, and therefore, I will speak in detail about them. With regard to the last element namely the "Soviet Threat," I will simply make a brief observation at the end.

Probably the single most important element in current American policy concerns Freedom of Navigation.

When the United States government decided to dispatch an armada to the Persian Gulf, it claimed that it was taking measures to prevent a disruption in the freedom of navigation in international waters. Noting that a large portion of the oil used by American allies in Europe and Japan passed through Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz provided, it was argued that it was a matter of American national interest to see to it that this waterway is open to international navigation.

This line of reasoning would logically suggest that all shipping in the Persian Gulf, or at least all shipping bound for Western consumption would be protected. But instead, 11 Kuwaiti tankers were superficially registered as American vessels, and the United States assumed the legal responsibility to protect them in the Persian Gulf. I do not want to deal with the legality of reflagging in international law. I would simply say that a strong legal argument could be advanced to prove that there exists no "genuine link" between the Kuwaiti vessels and the United States, and therefore they remain Kuwaiti vessels and not American flagged ships.

The issue is more fundamental than the question of legal credibility of this action. If you consider the existing statistics, more than 400 ships pass through the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf each month. The 11 reflagged Kuwaiti vessels do not even constitute 5% of this traffic. In fact, during 1987, attacks on merchant ships in the Persian Gulf increased by 50%. The reason that American policy created the opposite results of its proclaimed objectives is that the United States neglected the very clear cause of the threat to the freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf.

Let us look at the history of trouble in the Persian Gulf. In 1984, the government of Iraq -- which was facing difficulties on the ground in a war that it had started itself in 1980 -- started attacking Iranian and Iran-bound shipping in the Persian Gulf. You all know that due to the war, Iraq's only access to the Persian Gulf which is the port of Basra was dismantled and ceased to remain operational. Furthermore, Iraq has developed pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia which carry more than 2 million barrels of oil to other ports. Also, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia continued to sell their own oil through their ports in the Persian Gulf with a well-documented agreement that a certain portion of the proceeds of those sales would be paid to Iraq to help its war effort. Iraq also used Kuwaiti ports to receive weapons from its ally, the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, virtually all of Iranian oil has to go through its own facilities in the Persian Gulf. Iran called and continues to call for an immediate and complete cease-fire in the Persian Gulf. Many international efforts, including an 8 point plan by the Secretary-General of the United Nations which would, inter alia, stop attacks on merchant ships in the Persian Gulf were rejected by Iraq. My government had no option but to retaliate against Iraqi attacks on Iran-bound shipping in the Persian Gulf, and it retaliated by attacking Kuwaiti and Saudi bound ships known to carry oil destined to be sold for Iraq. Nevertheless, the majority of attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf from 1984 to the present has been carried out by Iraq. Overall, for every 3 ships hit by Iraq in the past 4 years, Iran has retaliated only against one. The most ironic fact is that the attack on USS Stark which caused the death of 37 American sailors was carried out by Iraq and not by Iran.

For creating such a tense climate in the region, Iraq had been under increasing pressure from its Kuwaiti and Saudi allies to step down its illegal attacks in the Persian Gulf. It was clear from the very beginning that the American protection of Kuwaiti vessels was interpreted in Iraq as a sign that they could continue and increase their attacks in the Persian Gulf without facing more pressure from their Kuwaiti allies.

Safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Persian gulf can only be achieved by including every one under the umbrella of protection. It cannot be done by making Iran-bound shipping fair game that Iraq could continue to hit with impunity. This is the fundamental flaw in the American policy, at least in this element of US policy in the Persian Gulf. The solution is simple. It has also been tested and proven effective. Under US pressure, Iraq did not hit any ships in the Persian Gulf from 29 July to 29 August 1987. During that period, no single ship was hit in the Persian Gulf. By compelling or inducing Iraq to refrain from its illegal attacks on merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf, it is possible to have complete safety for ships in the region, and safeguard freedom of navigation, without astronomical costs.

So much for protecting freedom of navigation. Let us now consider the second policy objective namely bringing about a Cease-Fire in the Iran-Iraq War.

It has been argued by the American government that the diplomatic counter-part of the reflagging policy is attempts at the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire to the Iran-Iraq war. For this purpose, the United States has tried very hard to convince the Security Council to pass a so-called "Second Resolution" to impose an arms embargo against Iran.

You all know that Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980, when my country had just undergone a fundamental change; a revolution. Our army was in total disarray, and we did not have any organized means of defense. The government of Iraq, which had signed a boarder treaty with Iran in 1975, thought that it was an opportune moment to gain some concessions from Iran, and increase its power and prestige in the region. In September 1980, when Iraq attacked us, every one predicted that Iraq would achieve total victory in less than a month. In fact, it was able to advance well into our territory within the first few days. Unfortunately, the United Nations did not do anything to stop the Iraqis. It simply called for cease-fire. It did not condemn Iraqi aggression. It did not even ask Iraq to withdraw from our territory.

Since the early days of the war, Iran called on the United Nations Security Council to fulfil its obligation under the Charter and condemn Iraqi aggression. In July 1987, the Security Council passed Resolution 598 which called for several things including a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq conflict. It also called for the establishment of a committee to determine responsibility for the war. Since July, we have worked with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in order to implement this resolution. We reached an agreement in September that two simultaneous steps should be taken. They are cease-fire on the ground and in the Persian Gulf and determination of responsibility for the war. This position was later approved by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, China, Soviet Union and Secretary of State of the US. Later, all members of the Security Council approved the plan. Since September, Iraq has failed to accept this plan. It has also made another demand. That is to add withdrawal and exchange of prisoners of war to the first stage. The Iraqi policy has in fact prevented the United Nations to bring about an end to the war which would also include an end to attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf.

Ironically, the United States is speaking of imposing an arms embargo against Iran. If the United States is really pursuing a policy of bringing about a cease-fire, it should try to impose pressure on Iraq and not Iran to accept the plan of the Secretary-General. In fact, we have challenged the Security Council stating that we are ready to implement the plan which includes an immediate cease-fire along with assessment of responsibility for the war. Let us be very clear. An arms embargo against Iran -- which has become the ultimate goal and obsession of the United States -- does not and will not bring about a cease-fire. It would in fact destroy all the progress achieved in negotiations between Iran and the Secretary-General of the UN. A cease-fire could only be brought about in line with the plan that US itself has endorsed. That requires pressure on Iraq which has yet to accept the plan and not on Iran which has already accepted it.

We now turn to the third element, namely supporting US Allies in the Region.

The third major pre-occupation of the United States policy has been claimed to be threats to the so-called conservative Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf area. There are two important issues that should be considered here.

First, Iran has always maintained that it seeks friendly and cooperative relations with the countries of the region. After all, we not only adhere to the same religion and have rooted social and cultural affinity with the Arab people of the region, but also we have many shared political and diplomatic objectives. The most important shared objective is safeguarding freedom of navigation and stability of the Persian Gulf. While Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have continued to provide massive financial and military support to Iraq, the other countries in the region including United Arab Emirates, Oman and Qatar have maintained very close relations with Iran. As far as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are concerned, we have always invited them to maintain a more neutral approach to the two belligerent in the war, and therefore enjoy our friendship and cooperation. Therefore, contrary to the claims by the US government, prior to the dispatch of American forces, there was no imminent threat to the so-called moderate Arabs of the Persian Gulf. In fact, the presence of American naval forces has exacerbated the tension, and threatens to widen the scope of the conflict.

The second major point in this respect is the fact that the United States armada cannot remain in the Persian Gulf forever. However, the Arab countries of the region will remain there along with Iran. We need to find among ourselves a way to continue to coexist. As early as May of 86, Iran proposed a regional security mechanism between Iran and the moderate Arab states of the Southern Persian Gulf. Real security can only be achieved when and if no one needs foreign forces to protect itself against perceived threats. Presence of foreign forces can only sow the seeds of distrust and anger among regional countries which can explode as soon as the foreign forces are gone. It is in this context that we have received many positive signals from the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. In their most recent meeting in Saudi Arabia, the members of Gulf Cooperation Council decided to adopt a more positive approach to Iran. They have invited us to participate in a high level meeting with them. We have welcomed this invitation and are working with them to arrange for a meeting of probably foreign ministers in the near future. The agenda of the meeting will include the question of presence of foreign forces in the region and their danger to regional security.

Now let me make a brief observation about the final element of American policy in the Persian Gulf; Preventing Soviet Presence.

The United States has only itself to blame for the increasing presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East region. By providing total and unconditional support for Israel, the United States continues to alienate masses of Arab and Muslim people of the Middle East. Its failure to take strong position against Israeli practices is the fundamental cause of its loss of power and prestige in the region. Its presence in the Persian Gulf may be able to prevent in the short run the predominance of the Soviet Union in the region. But this will have no long term effect for the United States until a fundamental change in policy vis-a-vis the issue of Palestine takes place in Washington.

Thank you very much for your attention.