In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me a great pleasure to address an audience of distinguished scholars for which I am grateful to the organizers of this Seminar. Receiving the invitation to take part in the Seminar, I did not hesitate to reply affirmatively. Coming at the time of 30th anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT, the Seminar, in my view, offers a propitious opportunity to better understand Iran's stand on nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. I should, however, admit that I do not take this objective lightly in that the atmosphere is heavily clouded by with misunderstanding, misperceptions, biases, lack of communication, and political considerations.

The Nuclear Era and Evolution of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

The drop of the first nuclear bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima shocked the world. The very fact that a single bomb can in a second cause destruction beyond imagination and kill hundreds of thousands of people indiscriminately terrified the international community. As details of the power of nuclear bomb were brought to public, the world public opinion became resolute in its rejection of nuclear option, though that demand went mainly unheeded by the sole possessor of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly, representing the all nations worldwide acted apace, adopting a resolution in January 1946 which established the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) whose remit was to make proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Soon, with the Soviet Union and three more countries successfully managing to produce a similar capability, the value of nuclear weapons diminished.

In 1968, the insertions of the international community culminated in the NPT, the first treaty on nuclear weapons, which entered into force two years later.

Iran and Nuclear Non-proliferation

Iran ranks amongst the first acceding countries to the NPT. It signed the Treaty in 1968 and proceeded with its ratification in 1970. It accordingly accepted the IAEA safeguards that provided for monitoring of its facilities and activities by the IAEA. Ever since, there has been, on the part of Iran, no questioning of or trifling with this freely undertaken commitment.

However, seemingly endless allegations about Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons have been brought up by the US. Almost every week or so, there appears some article in the newspapers or periodicals, giving details of so-called Iran's covert nuclear program and imminent rise of Iran as a nuclear weapon state. The White House and State Department's press briefings, as well as the Congress hearings and legislation have also followed suit, presenting Iran as a scarecrow.

We seriously doubt that the US concerns over our nuclear activities are real. Nonetheless, we have tried so hard to unveil the rationales behind the US allegations. The allegations can emanate from the US drive at portraying itself as the leader and savior of the world, requirements of its domestic politics, or its economic interest in selling more arms to the countries in the Middle East. They might also derive from the US tendency to stick to its dogma, or its intention to secure a bargaining position in bilateral relations with Iran. They might also serve as a pretext for the US to justify its unconditional support for and subservient to Israel's unrelenting hunger for weapons of mass destruction and above all nuclear weapons.

Still and all, whatever reasons might be involved, I see the need to entertain these concerns in that it help advance mutual understanding and obviate the existing misperceptions and unsubstantiated accusations

Why Forgoing Nuclear Option

Iran has long forgone nuclear weapons. And its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation remains unshaken for it has many interests in upholding its obligations to non-proliferation regime.

We maintain that nuclear weapons do not necessarily bring security. The Middle East, over centuries, has experienced many wars. And at present, it suffers from Israeli occupation and expansionism, feeding an arms race in the region. The introduction of nuclear weapons to this fragile region would further embroil an already very complicated situation In addition, by joining the exclusive club of nuclear weapon states one would certainly run the risk of becoming a target for the older members of the club.

For Iran, enjoying a strategic depth, a population of 65 million, well educated human resources - almost unmatched in the region - nuclear weapons are not critically existential, as it is for Pakistan in relation to its more populous and stronger rival, India.

Economically speaking, nuclear weapons are very costly and sap the economic energy of a country like Iran. They are costly in their development. They are costly in their stockpiling. And they are costly in terms of their opportunity cost. Iran has a young population. They need education, job and housing. Also, given the economic needs for reconstruction of war damages caused by an eight year Iraqi invasion of Iran, nuclear option certainly prove uneconomic. As an oil-exporting country, Iran heavily depends on free trade, a requirement that can only be attained through peace and tranquility. Moreover, Severity of economic and political sanctions, as well as cessation of technological cooperation, amongst others, serve as disincentives.

In short, the disadvantages of breaking with the non-proliferation regime outweigh its possible advantages.

The IAEA Safeguards

As I stated earlier, we have accepted the IAEA safeguards and all our nuclear facilities and programs are subject thereto. However, it might be contended that the IAEA safeguards are not airtight and they suffer from loopholes, citing Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program as an example.

To have an objective examination, I hold that Iraq experience should not be the yardstick against which the IAEA safeguards must be judged. The fact that Iraq could deceive IAEA inspectors were not merely due to shortcomings of the safeguards. Rather, it was largely the intentional ignoring by the West for political considerations of Iraq's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons that made it possible for the Iraqi Government to circumvent the safeguards. In other words, the political considerations of the West were instrumental in blinding the IAEA. A mistake many of them did later regret it. We really doubt that the West was unaware of Iraq's nuclear weapon programs until the arrival of UNSCOM visits to that country. For sure, they can find many reports on that subject matter in the archives of their intelligence services. Yet, as regards Iran, the situation is quite contrary. The West has employed all at its disposal to help the IAEA to miss nothing.

Double Standard

The US approach towards nuclear non-proliferation is an obtrusive illustration of double standard, discrepancy and inconsistency. While it expresses concerns over and creates barriers for peaceful nuclear activities of Iran, it has spared no effort in helping Israel, which has so far shied away from all the weapons of mass destruction treaties, to develop these inhumane and destructive weapons. Faced with the question as to why Israel should be exempted from the general norm of non-proliferation, the reply coming out of Washington disregards wisdom and common sense. "Israel has security concerns and until and unless there exists a peace accord in the Middle East it should not be asked to accede to weapons of mass destruction treaties". Does this reasoning hold only for Israel? Or another - country being neighbored by potential and active nuclear weapon states, having experienced the bitter taste of aggression and occupation, and seeing no sign of tranquility and peace along its borders at least for the near future - can invoke similar reasoning.

Let me stand clear here. Under no circumstances do I intend to legitimize nuclear option. But, I see the need to highlight the inherent dangers of such a double standard approach that would breed ambitions for proliferation.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

The peaceful uses of nuclear energy are numerous. The potential of further diversification and development of its use is enormous. Besides electricity generation, it has also been used extensively in agriculture, industry, medicine, biology and hydrology.

Determined to unfold the great potential of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Article IV of the Treaty offers a broad-based scheme for development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Article IV recognizes an inalienable right for all parties to the NPT to "develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination…". It further calls on "All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…" .

What Iran seeks is effective implementation of the treaty obligation of nuclear suppliers, under the NPT, as regards transfer of technology.

Strengthened Safeguards (93+2 Protocol)

Preventing possible future nuclear proliferation was the driving force behind the 1997 Model Additional Protocol. Even before the conclusion of the Model Additional Protocol, Iran undertook to volunteer two intrusive inspections, applying almost the same procedures foreseen in the Protocol. Many of you in the audience might not have heard of this initiative. The inspections confirmed nothing but Iran's full compliance with the NPT and peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

Now, the question might arise as to why Iran has not yet ratified the Model Protocol.

Drawing lessons from its compliance with the NPT, Iran has gathered that adherence to non-proliferation treaties would not lead to the enjoyment of positive incentives embedded in those treaties, including free access to technologies for peaceful purposes.

Iran seeks solely economic and technological development out of nuclear energy and stands ready to prove this. We have thoroughly reviewed the provisions of the Protocol and technically have no problem whatsoever to accede to it. Nevertheless, one needs to address two questions. Does the accession to the Protocol would help remove systematic and coordinated restrictions imposed on the Western companies to cooperate with Iran in development of peaceful nuclear technology? Does this action put an end to unfounded allegations by the US about Iran's nuclear activities? We strongly doubt that there would be any sign of relenting on the part of the US for the reasons I enumerated before. Because solution to the existing situation hinges on alteration of narrowly defined political and propaganda considerations of the US rather than proof of Iran's upholding the non-proliferation obligation.

Conclusion

To recap, our records in non-proliferation speak louder than words. We do not pursue an aggressive policy that might necessitate opting for a nuclear option. After the victory of Islamic Revolution in Iran, we have reviewed many of our policies. But, still for arbitrary, selfish, selective and discriminatory application of the NPT, we did not cast any question on our obligations under the NPT and faithfully cooperated with the safeguards of the IAEA. Even in 1995, when the decision on the extension of the Treaty was due, Iran did not stand against its indefinite extension. Nor did it attempt to withdraw from it. Should it had a nuclear ambition it would have had a good opportunity to leave the Treaty. It also did not bargain, like North Korea, its staying with the NPT, in return for realization of its demands for unhindered access to peaceful nuclear technology. I am confident that this audience agrees with me that the North Korean approach has been more effective.

The accusations surrounding Iran's nuclear activities are largely fabricated by the US. It is interesting to note that the US allegations are not shared by the international community, including its close allies. Even, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook have appreciated Iran's policy of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

At any rate, the NPT 1995 Review and Extension Conference asserted that States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements should direct such concerns along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA. Five years have elapsed since then and there has been no single filing a complaint against Iran's nuclear program.