Statement by H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister

and Head of Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran

at the Forth Session of the Preparatory Committee for

the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

January 24, 1995

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

The views of my delegation have already been included in the Non-Aligned position-paper, which was tabled during the third session of the Prep Com, and circulated as document NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13. We continue to subscribe fully to positions outlined in that paper. Therefore, I shall limit myself to a few observations and comments.

The concept of non-proliferation gained momentum during the peak of the cold war. At the time, it was perceived that nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the arms race were objectives that could not be realized particularly without fundamental changes in the nature of super-power relations. Non-proliferation was thus promoted as an attainable first step, until a comprehensive approach towards nuclear disarmament could be formulated.

The non-nuclear-weapon states agreed, following years of consultations, to prepare a treaty with the understanding that not even a single more state would become nuclear, that positive and negative security assurances would be provided to the states that forego the nuclear option, and that measures will be taken in good faith towards cessation of arms race and nuclear disarmament. At the same time, the non-nuclear-weapon states were ensured full access to science, technology and material for the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

Non-nuclear-weapon states, including particularly the developed ones, were also unanimous in calling for a limited original life span for the treaty with periodic reviews to examine whether the objectives of the treaty have been pursued in a balanced manner, and whether the rights of the state-parties are realized in parallel with the fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty.

The treaty that was finally concluded in 1968 contained specific articles reflecting these views and positions which were, at the time, shared by both developed and undeveloped non-nuclear-weapon states.

Following four review conferences, the conference in April provides us with a singular opportunity to have a thorough and comprehensive appraisal of the successes and failures of the treaty, enabling us to make a consensus decision about its future.

Mr. Chairman,

The treaty has no doubt served to curtail nuclear proliferation. The main objective of the treaty, however, has not been accomplished as possession of nuclear weapons is no longer limited to the original five. Access to nuclear weapons could not have been made possible without direct or indirect assistance by the Nuclear Supplier Group. The result of such breaches of obligations under the treaty have been devastating for the security of member-states as well as for the credibility of the treaty itself. This is particularly the case in the Middle East, where Israel's nuclear threat has undermined the security of all countries in the region and has lead to growing skepticism on the role and future of NPT by regional member-states.

It is evident, therefore, that private, secretive and non-representative groupings of limited membership cannot provide appropriate fora to deal properly and without loopholes with the fulfillment of the obligations and realization of the rights enshrined in the treaty. The decisions by these grouping have far-reaching security implications for all member-states, and as such, all member-states have the right to be fully involved and participate in consultations, discussions, and decisions in this regard.

The failures of the Nuclear Supplier Group have, at the same time, systematically been translated into further limitations on access to nuclear technology and material for peaceful purposes by complying member-states. Undeveloped non-nuclear-weapon states have been the subjects of discriminatory restrictive control regimes, thus being penalized for non-compliance of suppliers and the recipient proliferators.

Another major obstacle is the lack of a clear commitment for zero option by all nuclear-weapon states. Whereas China and, to some extent, Russia have been forthcoming in this regard, the other three have yet to express themselves explicitly on this important issue. Such re-commitment needs to be coupled with a time-bound framework and a target date for nuclear disarmament. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament will be enabled this year to commence negotiations on this matter.

Negotiations on CTBT and cut off are important measures towards completion of the non-proliferation scheme. Progress in these areas, along with implementation of the START treaties, can help establish a downward trend. However, we need to have a clear picture of what this jigsaw puzzle looks at the end while we attempt to put these pieces together.

Stalemate continues to persist on the other hand on provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states. The last session of the NSA Ad Hoc Committee barely succeeded in producing a final report, which contained no more than a set of contradicting positions by the NNWSU's versus NNWSD's and NWS's. It is incomprehensible that even in an area dealing with the most elementary rights of non-nuclear-weapon states, progress is absent.

Mr. Chairman,

It is doubtful that major changes required to permit indefinite extension of the treaty would come about in the short time left before the April Conference. The treaty should eventually be extended indefinitely once all the obligations, including nuclear disarmament are fully implemented and the rights set forth in the treaty, including the inalienable right to peaceful application of the technology are fully realized.

In the meantime, the only viable option is a form of extension that:

a. is founded on continued close periodic scrutiny,

b. is in line with an objective interpretation of Article X.2 of the treaty, and

c. enjoys consensus support.

Quasi-legal arguments which aim to enforce a specific option, by disregarding, misrepresenting, or superficially eliminating options specifically provided for in the treaty, should not be advanced.

It is advisable that insistence on options at the extreme ends of the spectrum begin quickly to give way to a feasible, more appropriate and broadly acceptable solution, which has the chance of attaining consensus support. Fortunately, the text of the treaty does provide for such an option in our view. We should utilize the remaining time to reach agreement on such a solution which would certainly enhance the treaty. My delegation is prepared to share its views and proposals with other interested delegations in due course.