In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The relationship between Islam and the West and the interaction between Islamic and Western concerns and ideals have taken various dimensions and are products of a complex set of ingredients. The recognition of the differences between the two and the appreciation and understanding of the historical background are the key to sober analysis and pragmatic planning for the future.

I suggest that three predominant models of interaction between Islamic and the Western world can be detected, which can be generally categorized into approaches characterized by assimilation, convenience or confrontation. I also suggest that a fourth model based on tolerance and understanding is possible, although it requires more work and foresight.

1. There have been instances, and indeed rather wide-spread tendency, of Muslim communities and particularly the elite looking up to the west. This was so because of Western achievements in the area of science and technology, its appealing pronouncements on democracy and human rights, and more than anything its military, economic and political power and clout.

1.1. These tendencies were translated into programs and policies encouraged by the West to more or less abandon and even suppress the indigenous values and traditions of Islamic societies and superficially profess and manifest Western values, life styles and political traditions. Secularist movements at the forefront of such tendencies always had an element of de-Islamization, implicit or even explicit in the initial phases of their programs.

1.2. Attractions for the elite and the general population were not always the same, nor were their expectations identical. But neither side found the fulfillment of their expectations in this relationship.

1.2.1. Instead of technological and scientific progress, the Islamic countries, like others in the developing world, faced very jealously-defined walls to protect national and economic interests of the west and its corporations, and maintain and even enhance its economic and scientific edge.

1.2.2. At the same time, t became evident that the advertised ideals of democracy and human rights were often sacrificed for the ever-supreme national interest, to the point that the concept of gradual or guided democracy which was once vehemently rejected by the west turned out to be the operative element of their behavior and even pronouncements with regard to the Muslim world.

1.2.3. In fact, western democratic ideals began to be perceived as merely the ideological justification, and not even the ideology, of the new wave of western domination.

2. The second model can be characterized by temporary understandings created by exigencies of interests.

2.1. There has been no attempt to establish any common ground in the two sides of these profitable relationships other than economic interest or political or military necessity. Nor even a serious dialogue has been initiated to foster understanding.

2.2. These marriages of convenience lack any serious foundation and can and in all possibility will collapse in the long term. This fact, which is universally acknowledged today, constitutes a most pressing problem at the international level in a near future.

3. The third model emanates from a tendency to adopt a crusader approach, trying to impose all norms and values of the West on Islamic societies.

3.1. This approach had always existed, but has more recently come to the forefront again.

3.2. In this approach, values particular to western experience, culture and even national interests have tended to be universalized. Much effort is placed on having them accepted and imitated by the rest of humanity.

3.2.1. Diversity of cultures is brushed aside as a justification for violation of these "universal" cherished values.

3.2.2. Devotion to one's own principles is automatically translated into a confrontational stance. And in the absence of the communist block, prophecies about clashes of civilization are put forward to depict a new enemy.

4. The common element of these models, despite their very different external manifestations, is intolerance of diversity.

4.1. Confrontation or assimilation are the measures to suppress this diversity; and when requirements of national interest prevail, a band-aid solution.

4.2. Thus, the underlying element of the alternative must be recognition of difference and tolerance. Now the fact that we are discussing this issue again here in Davos this year is in itself positive, and an indication of the recognition of the reality. The constituting elements of this reality can be summarized as follows:

4.2.1. We are dealing with two different civilizations, which have areas of commonality, and areas of divergence. These two approaches or interaction between them are not new. They came into contact with each other many centuries ago. There are areas where they have influenced one another, and indeed enriched each other. There have also been areas of friction and tension.

4.2.2. The two will never become identical.

4.2.3. Each has contributions to make in the international scene and must be provided with the possibility to participate actively in the international norm-setting process.

4.2.4. The attachment and devotion of Muslims to their religious identity and beliefs has proven naturally resistant to persecution by local authorities and intimidation from outside. As I said here last year, religion and devotion to values associated with it have proven their unparalleled strength and endurance. Whereas other ideologies and political cultures are temporary in nature and life span, religious belief lasts for millenniums. If given a breeding space, it manifests itself in the social life of its believers. And if officially suppressed, it will continue to remain a strong force and motivation in the hearts and minds of believers for centuries and can be transformed at any opportunity into a strong social force.

4.2.5. The tendency for revival of Islamic values is generally on the rise. Its accelerated momentum is partially a response to the failure of the west in providing an acceptable model and the wide inconsistency between its proclamations and actual behavior. As I said here last year, a common trend in Islamic movements in almost all Muslim countries is their initial reformist character. They begin as calls for justice and respect for indigenous institutions and values locally and rejection of alien domination and imposition of irreconcilable and incompatible values internationally.

4.3. An approach geared toward greater understanding will not be easy for either side.

4.3.1. It requires first and foremost mutual tolerance.

4.3.2. It also needs genuine and continual dialogue, not to convince or compel one side to accept the values of the other and assimilate, but to try to understand the values of each side and the contribution each can make to a truly universal set of standards for social and global behavior.

4.3.3. This approach requires thinking, foresight, hard-work and perseverance.

4.4. Certainly the path to confrontation and clash, despite its catastrophic consequences is an easier one.

4.4.1. It may also prove more sensational, and even more appealing to certain segments of each side.

4.4.2. It will certainly serve the interests of those who cannot live without an enemy and are looking hard to replaced the "red menace" with a "green menace".

4.4.3. Regrettably, we see more and more a tendency to adopt this path, disguised through theoretical arguments on the inevitability of a clash or political labeling of the other side.

5. While theories of clashes of civilization may become self-fulfilling prophecies, they are not necessarily the only available alternative in the relationship between Islam and the West. Certainly in our history, we have had instances of mutual enrichment, and both civilizations have greatly benefitted from them.