In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Text of Remarks by Dr. M. Javad Zarif

Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran

At Columbia University, 4 October 1999

I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation to Professor Gary Sick, and the Columbia University for organizing this informal gathering of thinkers, scholars and experts to discuss the global threat of Chemical Weapons and the position of Iran in this regard. It gives me a great pleasure to participate in this meeting, and share with you some thoughts on this subject, which is of significant importance to all of us and indeed to the international community as a whole. I find it very appropriate and timely to address the issue here, since the Chemical Weapons Convention may indeed be considered a global confidence-building instrument. Yet we have had very little opportunity to take advantage of this important function. Thus, I hope that my brief comments as well as those of my colleagues will ignite a healthy dialogue and exchange of views, and hopefully lead to a better appreciation of the realities on the ground as well as the perceptions of various actors.

Allow me to preface my comments here by a brief review of our perception of Iran’s security environment seen in the context of President Khatami’s development agenda.

Iran’s Security Environment

A brief study of Iran’s security environment would suggest that stability and security of Iran should not be dear only to itself. Our larger neighborhood, the Middle East has proved to be an active center of competing views and interests, rivalries and open wars and hostilities. Extreme political and social diversity, grave economic imbalance as well as diverse security perceptions coupled with controversial and sometimes contradictory patterns of alliance have made our region a unique one. I should also add to this list the sensitive strategic location of the region, which has historically attracted others.

The region bears the scars of Israeli occupation of Palestine and half a century of regional conflict. Israel and Iraq are known to possess chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and dangerous capabilities. Though Iraq is still subject to the UN arms inspection, the ongoing standstill in the UNSCOM activities and uncertainties regarding its future are a matter of concern. And Israel has refused to submit itself to any type of international monitoring.

In the Persian Gulf, we have a long and tedious road ahead to achieve the resemblance of an established security network originating from the region itself. The presence of foreign forces in the region is the best indication that there is either insecurity or an artificial sense of security in the region.

After more than two decades of war in Afghanistan, there exists no hope for peace. Instead, there is an increasingly dangerous likelihood of spill over of extremism to other parts of the region – as the recent developments in Daghistan have illustrated -- and a real threat that Weapons of Mass Destruction fall in the hands of terrorists operating from Taliban controlled parts of Afghanistan.

The Process of state building in Central Asia and the Caucasus has been less turbulent than most expected, promising a gradual transition to democratic and stable independent states in former Soviet Republics. But it has not been without crises. The situation in Tajikistan and Karabakh are two examples of turmoil at our immediate vicinity.

The recent nuclear tests in South East Asia deeply challenged Asian security and undermined hopes for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It also added to the number of neighbors of Iran with nuclear capability or nuclear Umbrella.

Threat Perceptions

Like other nations, Iran’s threat perception is generally a derivative of our geographic location, our security environment and our historical experience particularly after the Revolution.

Iranian people are not at all unfamiliar with war. They experienced war and destruction not only in the battlefields, but also at their cities, neighborhoods and homes, thanks to Saddam’s doctrine of total war. They also felt global indifference. War at home and in the neighborhood has immediate impact on people’s lives. A better future for the people who have suffered immensely from years of imposed war, tension and violence in the region would require tranquility and stability in the region as a prerequisite for both political and economic development of Iran. The Government is firm in its declared position of detente and would do its utmost in alleviating the causes of tension in its surrounding.

Waves of refugees, coming from Iraq, Afghanistan and even Karabakh have made Iran the largest refugee recipient in the world. Thus regional security and stability in neighboring countries have direct economic and social impact. For this, confidence building at various levels constitutes a priority both in our bi-lateral relations as well as in multilateral fora such as the Islamic Conference where we currently preside.

Weapons of mass-destruction have been used against Iran and have persistently presented a major threat to national security interests of Iran during the last two decades. These weapons continue to exist in the region. Any possessor of WMD with the ability to target Iran is considered a perceived threat. The two notorious possessors of WMD in the region, namely Israel and Iraq, together with the others to a lesser extent, will remain under our careful scrutiny.

In the choice between acquisition and non-proliferation, Iran has had a strong preference for the latter, although as I will elaborate later, it was forced once to opt for acquisition, albeit temporary. Therefore, non-proliferation and total elimination of weapons of mass destruction will remain the option and a high national priority at the regional and international level.

As a major victim of terrorism, Iran perceives training, financing and provision of safe haven to terrorists as a major security threat. Such is in abundance in the region, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Globally, Iran ironically has been the subject of smear campaign in this area, leading to imposition of various types of restrictions by the United States, which has hampered regional economic development.

Last in my sketch but certainly not least in importance is a demographic fact. Iran’s population is relatively young; it has its own special requirements, necessitating the undivided attention of the government. This segment of the population is extremely vulnerable to various cultural and social afflictions, particularly narcotics. The national campaign against drugs and global cooperation to combat drug trafficking thus constitute another priority.

Determinants of Iran’s Security Policy

The domestic process of analyzing Iran’s security environment, articulating threat perception, formulating appropriate responses and forging a national consensus on strategies to enhance national security and optimize national interest is complicated and time consuming. It involves governmental and academic experts, Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the Parliament as well as the leadership. It is also the subject of careful scrutiny of an ever more demanding civil society: the press, political tendencies and groupings, universities, a growing number of NGO’s and the general public. Consensus building in this diversified atmosphere requires clear and logical articulation of strategies, which are perceived by the general public to advance national security and interest in a difficult neighborhood. Transparency and tolerance for diversity of views even on subjects as complicated as non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction is a necessity for the success of this exercise; a necessity that is easily appreciated for western democracies, but often misunderstood and misinterpreted in the west when applied by third world democracies such as ours.

Another determinant of Iran’s national security formation is the general platform presented by President Khatami during his campaign and overwhelmingly approved by the general population. Peace and sustainable development are the cornerstones and the reinforcing ingredients of this platform. It involves political, social and economic development domestically; an ambitious project, which has been further complicated by years of autocratic rule prior to the revolution, absence of a culture of participation, devastation of a long and costly war, unilateral US economic sanctions and a generally instable security environment.

This approach rests on removing the barriers, domestic and global. Confidence building and dialogue are the imperative global dimensions. The notion of Global Security Networking, which I proposed to the Conference on Disarmament last February, helps Iran and the other regional states to guarantee their own security, while respecting and addressing security needs of others inside and outside the region. This new security paradigm starts from the proposition that security is the indivisible need and demand of the entire human race. Global security networking is inclusive and participatory, and uses the existing mechanisms in a complimentary rather than competing scheme. Thus, adoption of security enhancement measures by one country or coalition is not tantamount to loss or deprivation for others. Rather, as with components of any network, measures by any group to enhance its security, augment the security of the entire network and all its members.

Iran’s Commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention

Let me now turn specifically to chemical weapons. For the reasons I stated above and some that I will explain later, our commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention are founded solidly in our national security strategy. No nation has ever suffered more from chemical weapons. We, as the last victim of chemical weapons, have paid a heavy toll in terms of human lives, chronic illnesses and genetic disorders. As for emotional and psychological wounds, the horrifying memories of human suffering incurred by chemical weapons are and would remain vivid for years to come. This has convinced our nation that possession of chemical weapons could not and should not be perceived as a source of power and security. And it should not, therefore, have any part in Iran’s military doctrine.

Keeping our long-term national security concerns in sight, there is all but a unanimous consensus among statesmen in Iran that our national interests and security lie in full and expeditious implementation of the Convention. The chemical weapons threat is dangerously real. To rid the world of this threat, one needs to ensure the universality of the CWC. We believe that it is only accession to the Convention that would bring security assurances for all nations. That is why we are adamantly working for the universality of the Convention.

Iran’s Record

Iran has consistently underscored four basic principles that would help achieve the Convention’s ends:

• Ensuring universality of the Convention;
• Non-discrimination and equal treatment of all States Parties;
• Enhancement of international security and the security of individual states; and finally
• Maintaining a delicate balance between the twin objectives of eradicating an entire class of weapons of mass destruction while removing all impediments for development of chemical industry and free trade of chemicals amongst all states.

We have also acted in a transparent manner. In compliance with our commitments and in line with the provisions of the Convention, in November 1998, we submitted to the Technical Secretariat of the Convention a number of declarations, which included information concerning capabilities that were developed during the last years of the war. Let me elaborate a bit further.

Today, considering the magnitude of international concern over Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, it is difficult to imagine that only a decade ago, the same regime used chemical weapons on a large scale against Iranian military personnel and even civilians with total impunity. As records uncovered by UNSCOM indicate, Iraq was assisted by a number of Western countries in its development of these deadly weapons. And in the Security Council, a number of members including the United States – in pursuit of its policy of open tilt toward Iraq – prevented any action despite irrefutable evidence collected by various United Nations investigation teams. For more than three years, the Council largely ignored reports of investigations. Not even a single Security Council resolution was adopted until the very end of the war when Iraq used chemical weapons against its own civilians in Halabja. In the two or three presidential statements that were issued by the Council during the entire long and difficult three years of confirmed use of chemical weapons by Iraq -- amounting to one of the largest and most persistent uses of chemical weapons in recent history -- the Security Council failed even to name Iraq as the culprit. It may be noteworthy for some of you that the best it could do was to use the innovative phrase of “the use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers” as if any party other than Iraq could have used it. Emboldened by a sense of impunity, Iraq even threatened to use chemical weapons against large population centers including Tehran.

Facing such an extensive use of chemical weapons against soldiers and civilians alike coupled with the acquiescence and even open collaboration of major global players with the culprit, Iran concluded that no other alternative was left but to resort to the only remaining means of deterrence in order to halt savage slaughter of Iranian people by Iraqi chemical weapons. This particularly became an absolute necessity when threats were made against large population centers.

Following extensive deliberations at Iran’s National Security Council – also known in war days as the Supreme Defense Council, the decision was made to develop a limited deterring capability. We declared at the time through then Prime Minister Moosavi that Iran possessed chemical weapons capability.

Notwithstanding this new capability, Iranian religious leadership found it very difficult to condone the use of these weapons, even as reprisal. Furthermore, our relatively primitive locally developed capabilities were no match for the very advanced chemical warfare machine of Iraq, which benefited from decades of Western technology and experimentation. Thus the policy not to resort to these weapons and instead to rely on diplomatic means to prohibit them globally and stop their use by Iraq was articulated and actively pursued. Soon after, the war ended precluding the horrifying prospects of Tehran being the victim of a chemical attack, and the agony of deciding about reaction. We ceased the difficult and costly mass production of chemical weapons. At the same time, we pursued vigorously to secure an early conclusion of a comprehensive and effective ban of chemical weapons under the CWC. This policy has ever since been followed, in particular through ratifying the Convention, implementing its provisions and working for its success.

In this respect, I should note that subsequent to our declaration at the Third Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC, an inspection was made in 1999 by the Technical Secretariat of the Convention. The visiting team examined Iran’s declared sites and facilities and approved the accuracy of our declarations. In a gesture of good faith and full compliance, we decided voluntarily to destroy these facilities in the presence of the visiting team, although this was not the mandate of the team and we were not obliged to do so at such an early stage.

Global Reaction

The consistency and transparency demonstrated by Iran was not compatible with the prevailing mis-portrayal of Iran. It took many by surprise and reaction was slow and measured. A number of developed countries started, albeit very slowly, to ease restrictions on transfer of technology and material for peaceful purposes in accordance with their commitments under the Convention. However, few others, most notably the United States, have continued or even further intensified impeding development of Iran’s peaceful chemical capability. The United States has even neglected the reports of the OPCW and has continued to raise the same old accusations against Iran.

The policy of selectivity, discrimination and arbitrary discretion in the implementation of the provisions of the Convention will have no impact but undermining its integrity and consistency. The Convention is an integrated whole; that is an interwoven body of norms, whose provisions are mutually reinforcing. It is impossible to neglect and violate any one segment without undermining the entire Convention.

There is a delicate and sensitive balance between proliferation concerns and the imperative of promotion of cooperation for peaceful purposes. During the course of negotiations on the Convention, it was the consistent position of developing countries that restrictions and export control mechanisms outside the provisions of the Convention are not justifiable and should all be dismantled. Following intensive negotiations on the subject, formal statements were made to articulate the commitment that the restrictions placed by the Australia Group would be dismantled once the Convention became operational. These statements were highly crucial in allowing a consensus to be achieved on the draft Convention. But, that commitment was not kept. Even, the entry into force of the Convention and the operation of its verification mechanism has yet to convince the Australia Group to live up to its commitments. In fact, the ad-hoc restrictions have continued to rigidify and grow in scope and extent.

The Director-General of the OPCW, in his address to the Forth Session of the Conference of the State Parties, has made a very pertinent observation in this regard. He stated:

As the Convention contains its own in-house export control regime, it becomes increasingly difficult, after entry into force, to justify the continuing application of ad-hoc export control regimes to state parties to the Convention… A prolonged continuation of the current situation can only damage the Convention and its long-term goal, which we have all pledged ourselves to support.

Iran for many obvious reasons has attached the highest priority to ensuring the integrity of the Convention and its full implementation, in particular its article XI. In the process of ratification, the Parliament placed particular emphasis on realization of certain requirements. Among these was full, unconditional and non-discriminatory implementation by all States Parties of all provisions of the Convention. It required the government to regularly monitor this matter and report any violation to the National Security Council.

Reviewing the position of certain developed countries, one would clearly note another inconsistency. Bearing in mind the experience of Iraqi development of a sophisticated chemical arsenal, they initially favored a very rigid and intrusive verification mechanism and consequently managed to win its integration into the Convention. Ironically, that policy did not last long, for they had soon to give in to the pressure from their own chemical industries. Although others have undertaken to convince their chemical industries, the US administration is yet to act. The conditions attached by the Senate in its ratification of the Convention are a matter of serious concern. These conditions by a state party, possessing both chemical weapons and the largest chemical industry, could encourage others to follow suit and imperil the objectives of the Convention.

Our Expectations

By joining the CWC, Iran sought primarily to attain the twin ends of enhanced security and unhindered trade. The attainment of the former hinges, to a very large extent, on the universality of the Convention. Giving up the chemical weapons option, we would be more vulnerable to the threats of chemical weapons, if some decide, in particular in our region, not to accede to the Convention. Therefore, it is of utmost importance for us to secure universal accession to the Convention. We strongly believe that the States Parties have to collectively undertake to convince non-members to ratify the Convention as soon as possible.

International cooperation to enhance trade and technological exchanges for peaceful purposes is a very compelling incentive for accession. Here, the detrimental role of the Australia Group cannot be over-emphasized. Questions have frequently been raised as to whether there is a differentiation between parties and non-parties to the CWC as regards transfer of technology, equipment and material or whether submission to the extremely intrusive verification regime of the CWC would provide for removal of ad-hoc and arbitrary restrictions on trade in chemicals. These are yet to be answered.

Role of Academia

In conclusion, I would like to underscore the important role of the academic and scholarly community in promoting the universality of the Convention. The looming dangers of partial implementation of the Convention and lack of its universality need to be constantly underlined. Understanding security concerns of various players in the international scene and making a serious attempt to develop a global security paradigm that can address these concerns is essential, but largely forgotten. The academic communities in various countries can play a pivotal role in this endeavor, and this is yet another area where dialogue among civilizations – that is exchange between thinkers, intellectuals and visionaries – will prove instrumental and indeed imperative for the very survival of human race.