Statement by H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif

Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran

at the Special Session of the UNGA

In The Name of God ,The Compassionate the Merciful

Mr. President,

Have we achieved what we have yearned for through decades- a comprehensive ban?

Have we succeeded in freezing the development of nuclear weapons?

Have we at long last set the stage for nuclear disarmament?

Will this generation or our children be able to open their eyes one day soon to a world that is no longer haunted by the horror of nuclear weapons- a nuclear weapon free world?

It has taken fifty years since the first nuclear test in Los Alamos in New Mexico to put an end to these tests. Through this time Nuclear Weapons States have conducted ... nuclear weapon tests for development and qualitative improvement of their nuclear arsenals.

The Non-aligned States have thus persistently called for prohibition of testing and conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The objective also remained consistent: an end to development of nuclear weapons in all its aspects as a step towards nuclear disarmament.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty considered and recognized nuclear testing as a permit to enter the nuclear weapons club of restricted and closed membership. Hence, according a special status to those states who had the ability and the will to conduct nuclear tests.

During negotiations on the NPT, within the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee, the Non- aligned States demanded an express commitment and a provision in the Treaty for the CTBT along with some other steps towards nuclear disarmament. The demand was based on the United nations General Assembly Resolution which had stressed on equal commitments by nuclear and non-nuclear states within the Treaty.

In the NPT Review Conferences too the demand had been reiterated by Non-aligned members to the point that some ever failed to arrive at a Final Declaration due to lack of agreement on this issue. In the last conference in 1995, the indefinite extension of the NPT would not have come about if the CTBT was not clearly in the horizon.

There is therefor no question that the call for the CTBT has been initiated by the Non-aligned States as a necessary step towards nuclear disarmament and through years of deliberation it had become an essential part of the Non-aligned vision for the future of our world.

The Non-aligned States therefor should be rejoicing today when a text of the CTBT is before the General Assembly for adoption.

Presumably yes. But we see here, to our most profound regret, is an attitude that can at best be described as somber.

Why is it then that the Non-aligned shows no enthusiasm for a treaty that it has pursued assiduously and worked for tirelessly during 40 years. The answer I believe is too evident to require any complex, Conceptual or philosophical debate.

The Text presented today as the CTBT is not placed in its nuclear disarmament context in the manner that it was called for. Further, we had not perceived a CTBT only as a CTBT or as a non-proliferation instrument. The treaty must have terminated fully and comprehensively further development of nuclear Weapons. What the current text does with its limited scope which bans only explosions limits such development in certain aspects while leaving other avenues wide open.

This is not just a matter of wording. It is a matter of intentions. In Geneva some Nuclear Weapon States were adamant and explicit in stating that this Treaty is not aimed at ending the development of nuclear weapons and that such developments should be allowed and would continue with more sophisticated techniques.

We are concerned, therefor, and we have reason to be concerned.

This Treaty cannot be considered in a vacuum. There is no secret any more that competition has already started in collection and utilization of data collected from nuclear explosions to conduct advanced simulation testing. There is serious and real risk, therefore that the nuclear arms race would be reignited at a new level.

This draft Treaty can, hence, be effective essentially in arresting proliferation and containing some nuclear weapons states and fails to freeze further development of nuclear weapons by all states. It does, in a sense create two classes of membership within the nuclear club, as ability and capacity for qualitative development becomes more exclusive.

It is, on the other hand, a matter of public information that nuclear disarmament continues to remain in the oblivion as commitment is absent for any step beyond CTBT and possibly the Cut- Off. It has in fact been stated openly and repeatedly by some Nuclear Weapon States that no other measure could be envisaged at the international level towards nuclear disarmament save existing bilateral nuclear reduction arrangements. Any notion of introducing time-frames, even flexible ones, for measures which lead to nuclear disarmament have also been rejected and even ridiculed.

The Text, therefore, has major shortcomings in areas that are essential to preserve its stated objectives.

There are also other problems in the text. In a number of areas the text fails to meet our expectations and expectations of the Non-aligned countries as a whole. One particular problematic area relates to the question of National Technical Means.

Here, the Non-aligned States had insisted through, at the negotiations that with an elaborate and extensive International Monitoring system resort to National Technical Means as a means to trigger inspection was unnecessary and irrelevant. In devising the verification regime it was always borne in mind that it should be effective and comprehensive and should, at the same time, not be open to abuse.

Two years of intensive discussions and negotiations with participation of highly qualified experts from various countries of the world led to the system designed specifically for the treaty, a system which includes more than 300 stations from four monitoring networks to register and detect the principle features of any probable nuclear explosions. The geographical coverage is such that data is collected simultaneously from all parts of the world and transmitted instantaneously to the international data center.

Despite all this, some Nuclear Weapon States who normally consider any international systems as unreliable and have strong tendencies towards unilateralism remained intransigent on the position that such an extensive, comprehensive and expensive International Monitoring System should be equal in authority to their National Technical Means. What that meant was that individual States could be enabled to register claims of Violation based solely on their own private sources.

In this context, arguments raised on the necessity of detecting sub-critical explosions turned out to be only a pretext. Otherwise, the proponents of the idea should have agreed to limit the validity of national means to these explosions with the proviso that application they would be phased out once the International Monitoring System was equipped to detect sub- critical tests. What we saw at the end was that despite opposition from great majority of States the position of the one or two unilateralists prevailed.

We consider, however, that the changes at the last stage which, increased the number of votes required to trigger an inspection on the basis of NTMs could reduce the possibility for abuse. We insist, at the same time, that by no means should the text be interpreted as allowing equal status or weight to national means in comparison to the International System.

There is also another problem which is purely political and has nothing to do with the Treaty and as such was completely avoidable. Israel has for the last four decades been traditionally considered a part of the Western Group in most major international organizations. Yet, for some mysterious reasons, some in the Western Group rejected Israel from their Group and imposed it instead in the "Middle East and South Asia" Grouping. This despite the fact that such inclusion has been opposed throughout the negotiations.

What appears in the Text therefore in this regard is an aberration which remains objectionable. Let me assert that those few who intended to score a political point, have, by doing so, created an obstacle in the implementation of the Treaty as the confrontation of the States in this regional group would make it tremendously difficult for the Executive Council to form. The Conference of the States Parties then would eventually be compelled to find a way to redress this problem.

Above all this is the irregular and uncanny manner in which negotiations were brought to an end. There is no doubt in our mind that the remaining problems could be resolved in a compromise if the intention existed. Yet, despite availability of time, no real discussion or consultation took place once the text was presented, as the few who had managed to inscribe their one-sided positions in the text during the final exclusive round of negotiations threatened the unravelling of the whole text against even an infinitesimal alteration.

In sum, therefore, this Text is grossly titled towards the position of a few nuclear weapons States and their allies and lacks severely in balance.

Therefore, back to the questions I raised at the beginning, then, the treaty does not meet the expectations of the great majority of the world. The treaty fails its stated objectives and intended context. It also falls short of what the mandate had called for. It is a text that is fine tuned to satisfy the views and positions of a few Nuclear Weapon States. There is therefore no real cause for celebration.

Most of the States who have eventually agreed to allow the draft Treaty to pass have done so with hesitation and reserve. Many have expressed their malcontent at the CD or here, and else-where. Support is disheartened and dispirited.

For us too this is a difficult decision. We have been among the major proponents of the CTBT all along. We have spared no effort to promote and to achieve it. We presented a draft compromise text at a time that the positions of various interlocutors were miles apart. That text, incidentally is still believed by many to present a much more reasonable balance than the one that is moved for adoption here today.

in our overall assessment, therefore, and based on extensive consultations with other States (including some high level exchanges with certain States )We have come to the conclusion that we would go along with the decision here.

This of course does not mean that we have yielded on our principle positions. We reserve those positions and we will redouble our efforts in collaboration with other Non-aligned States to push for a program for nuclear disarmament within agreed time- frames. We shall not rest until our planet earth is freed from the scourge of nuclear weapons.

It is also our expectation that other non-nuclear-weapon states including particularly Australia who has initiated this Resumed Session to adopt the Text of the Treaty, to join hands with us in impressing upon Nuclear Weapon States that lukewarm claims of commitment to nuclear disarmament can no longer be expected. The CTBT, with all its shortcomings, should bring us to a stage to accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament through negotiations on a consecutive series of subsequent Treaties.