Statement by H.E. Dr. M. Javad Zarif

Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran

before the Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, 2 February 1999

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. President,

I would like to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I should also express my delegation’s sincere appreciation to your predecessor for his untiring efforts.

We, on the eve of a new millennium, are standing at a defining cross road in the history of humanity. Scientific and technological breakthroughs, growing interdependence, impressive development of standards of behavior at the international level, and the emergence of a global consensus to prevent war and curb the perils of armaments and particularly weapons of mass destruction are indeed significant achievements of the twentieth century. Translating these general developments in terms of concrete progress in the field of disarmament, one may note the promotion of multilateralism in all fields of disarmament negotiations, the conclusion and entry into force of an array of significant disarmament treaties, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (N.P.T.), the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the forthcoming additional protocol to BWC, providing for a verification regime and finally the end of a frantic and hysterical arms race between the superpowers.

However, in spite of these historic accomplishments, the twentieth century will also be remembered by vivid images of unspeakable horror and bloodshed resulting from our failure to forge an inclusive global security system, in a world in which Man, enabled by science, is capable of his own total destruction. The absence of such a system has exacerbated the security dilemma and lead to the employment of science for production of the most lethal weapons of all.

Toward Global Security Networking

For a very long time, balance of terror coupled with military block security umbrellas -- an exclusive privilege provided solely to members of the two major alliances and their associates -- has been presumed to ensure security. The security dilemma and the prevalence of terror have also been the driving force behind the temptation and quest by some to acquire the most lethal weapons, in particular nuclear ones. The recent developments in South Asia are yet another set of disturbing evidence of the fact that the temptation and quest would continue to survive as long as we fail to forge a new approach to security and particularly to complete nuclear disarmament.

Perilous signs are looming in the horizon. The risks are real, immense and impending. With the uncertainties associated with the transitional nature of global order, a tremendous obsession is evident to preserve military supremacy or assume a more prominent global role in the future order through acquisition of more advanced weapons of greater range, accuracy and lethality; Something that might quite unravel the progress towards disarmament achieved earlier in this decade.

It is high time to change this predominant yet erroneous security paradigm. Fundamental to this is adoption of a new approach towards international security going beyond the boundaries of the residuals of the bipolar system, which is fixated in the past. It is no longer acceptable or even practical to divide the international community into two distinct groupings. One living behind the walls of fortresses of alliances and weapons of mass destruction, while the security concerns of others are completely neglected as they are depicted as the source of possible threat and worthy of containment and deprivation. It is specially alarming that pseudo-scientific theories of clash are advanced in order to perpetuate the policies of rivalry and exclusion and even sanctify them as the unavoidable consequences of civilizational disharmony.

The time has come to replace military block security umbrellas with a new and innovative concept of Global Security Networking; a truly global networking mechanism for an inclusive and participatory global security, which uses the existing mechanisms in a complimentary rather than competing schemes.

Disarmament: A Step in Right Direction

In shaping this new global security, we should agree that weapons of mass destruction should have no place in any global security networking and should be banned all together and destroyed. We cannot seek to establish a civilized community of human beings and states without accepting the premiss that all peoples and all states have an equal right to survive and to guarantee peace and security for citizens. Mass destructive weapons, by their very existence, undermine this basic principle as well as the most fundamental human rights and the very foundations of international humanitarian law. We should not accept that our children in the coming millennium should continue to live under the horrifying shadow of possible use of these weapons. We must ensure that the people of Iran and Japan are the very last victims of weapons of mass destruction of any type at any time and under any pretext whatsoever. This, of course, requires enlightened, serious and coordinated endeavor at national, regional and international levels.

It is a source of deep satisfaction to see that the Chemical Weapons Convention has now entered into force. The Convention, through its comprehensive verification regime, can indeed operate as a major confidence building mechanism by ensuring that such weapons are removed from the military arsenal and defense strategies of its parties within a 10 year time span. Yet, this mechanism can become enormously more dependable by promoting its universality, in particular in sensitive regions including the Middle East. Equally important is that we should not settle for less than full implementation of the convention. Selective and partial implementation of the convention, or introduction of conditions, in addition to being clear violation of its letter and spirit, would irreparably undermine its credibility and relevance.

The Biological Weapons are already banned by the 1972 convention. The ongoing efforts to strengthen the convention through the establishment of an effective verification system deserve our support. The need for serious negotiations to establish such a system at the earliest possible date has been strongly underlined by the international community, most recently during Ministerial Meeting held in New York last September. Biological weapons are amongst the most destructive and inhuman weapons ever conceived and we have the political and moral responsibility to ensure that these weapons will never be developed, used or stockpiled. The protocol under negotiation should therefore be effective and strike a balance between the rights and obligations of the states parties. It should envisage provisions, and if necessary should establish mechanism to ensure and facilitate peaceful use and exchange of materials, equipment and technology among states parties. We are prepared to cooperate with all states concerned in order to ensure conclusion of negotiations on the protocol before the year 2000.

As regards nuclear disarmament, practical measures are yet to be taken. Save for some piecemeal undertakings, including a host of bilateral agreements, the path to a comprehensive nuclear disarmament is largely untraveled. Political, security and military considerations of Nuclear Weapon States have made the process of total elimination of nuclear weapons a more difficult and complex enterprise. But, that by no means justifies the disengagement of the international community, the multilateral fora, and above all, the Conference on Disarmament to start considering ways and means to promote nuclear disarmament. In fact, in the initial stages, the ban on the other categories of weapons of mass destruction were considered somehow ambitious, unpractical and unfeasible. But through the mobilization of necessary political will at the global level, we were able to resolve many difficult and at times fundamental differences over issues which apparently seemed unsurmountable. This seems even more relevant to nuclear disarmament. What continues to be lacking is the political will to abandon theories and strategies which belong to the past.

I believe that nuclear disarmament needs to be pursued within a practical approach structured in three phases: short, medium and long term.

Promotion of confidence is at the heart of short-term initiatives, which would be pursued by the Nuclear Weapon States bilaterally and multilaterally. Vigorous reduction of nuclear weapons, coupled with certain specific measures, including de-alerting of nuclear forces, de-targeting of nuclear weapons, ratification of START-2 as well as finalization and implementation of START-3 should be accorded priority.

For medium term, the main focus should be on multilateral agreements, codifying legal restrains for the use of nuclear weapons. In this area, an agreement to assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons -- which in our view can best be pursued within the N.P.T. Context, a treaty to ban the first-use of nuclear weapons and finally a convention on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be worked out.

At the same time, we should continue to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and continue vigorously initiatives to establish nuclear-weapon free zones in various parts of the world, particularly in more sensitive regions.

The first two phases inch us closer to the ultimate goal of comprehensive nuclear disarmament. And at last, the final stage would offer negotiations on a global treaty banning nuclear weapons and providing for their destruction under an effective international control.

N.P.T. was indefinitely extended to prepare the ground for nuclear disarmament. We must all ensure that this shall happen. And we all, in particular the nuclear weapon states have the responsibility to ensure the success of the non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, which also include the eventual total elimination of these weapons. Nuclear disarmament, in our view, would preserve the treaty’s integrity and credibility.

The non-proliferation regime is facing fresh challenges. CTBT is in perils. Statements from India and Pakistan lead to some optimism that we could resume the right track. The un-safeguarded nuclear facilities in the Middle East are a real threat to the non-proliferation regime. Israel, in defiance of numerous calls from the international community, has rejected to place its nuclear program and facilities under the IAEA safeguards and continues with its clandestine programs. This is an alarming policy that menaces global and regional peace and security. The Year 2000 N.P.T. Review Conference should seriously and frankly address this concern and offer practical solutions.

The Conference on Disarmament and the Future

The Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body has a very prominent role in ensuring global peace and in moving towards global security networking . It has been the main launching board of various disarmament treaties and likewise it should remain. To preserve such an outstanding role, the Conference has to design a grand strategy. Things should happen by design and not by default. We need to know where we are heading. The agenda, program of work and the Ad-Hoc Committees of the Conference should reflect our collectively agreed grand strategy. Running the risk of appearing overly optimistic, I believe that this is possible, provided that the requisite political will, determination and commitment could be mobilized.

The question of the expansion of the CD is, in our view, a part of this broad picture. We understand the rationale of universality of the CD. Nonetheless, one should not loose sight of the fact that there is a close correlation between the expansion of the CD and its efficiency. The CD is meant to be a negotiating body. And as such, it should be manageable and able to perform its functions effectively so as to live up to the expectations of the world community.

We also appreciate the aspiration of the five soon-to-be members of the CD that have waited long for their admission. We sympathize with their national aspirations to join the CD and we tend to accommodate them. Given our general approach regarding the future and the emerging role of the Conference, this has required a lengthy and difficult process of reflection and assessment.

As for the future, the issues of expansion and efficiency need to be seen together and be revisited in the light of a careful assessment of the impacts of previous expansions on the efficiency of the Conference. In any event, transparency in the decision-making process on this issue is an absolute necessity on which we shall not compromise in the future. Furthermore, any future proposal must be fitted within a general policy of expansion as opposed to a piecemeal approach.

Conclusion

As we enter a new millennium, we need to adopt a new perspective. We need to revisit old strategies and doctrines, which were founded in theoretically week and historically unsound constructs, as deterrence and balance of power, or indeed of terror. The challenge of the twenty first century is not just loose nukes, not even nukes per se; the challenge is the mentality that believes any country, whatsoever, still needs nukes or can justify having them or claim that they are safe in their arsenal.

Doctrines and policies of arms race, block formations and exclusions have not brought our global community any real sense of security or peace. We need to rethink these very policies and reassess our fundamental assumptions; and I regret that this is yet to happen. Before a new round of rivalry and exclusion is entrenched, perpetuated and sanctified through the theories of clash and conflict between nations and even civilizations, the international community must adopt the strategy of dialogue, tolerance and inclusion. The Conference on Disarmament’s mission for the 21^st century must center on an active pursuit of this imperative, breaking away with outdated perspectives and beginning to look seriously at new paradigms such as Global Security Networking.