In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. President,

I am very pleased to speak before the Conference on Disarmament after a breakthrough in a more than a year of stalemate in its program of work.

Nuclear Disarmament

The recent nuclear tests in South Asia and the escalation of tension in the region have once more highlighted the prominent role of the Conference on Disarmament in contributing to regional and international peace and security. It has equally sharpened the focus on nuclear disarmament as the highest priority of the world community. Articulation of and agreement on practical and effective methods of attaining the global aspiration of total elimination of nuclear weapons remain the genuine preoccupation of the CD.

With an eye to the future, we should draw lessons from this experience and set the stage for prevention of similar incidents. In line with this approach, there is the need for a fresh look at the question of nuclear disarmament.

For decades, numerous calls for nuclear disarmament have fallen on deaf ears and much to the frustration of humanity at large, there has been little significant progress in this regard. Even the clear and historic advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice emphasizing the legal obligation to engage in genuine effort for the elimination of these weapons have yet to be headed.

While an overwhelming majority of states insist on multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, some nuclear weapon states speak solely of reduction and insist that even this issue is best left to bilateral negotiations amongst the nuclear weapon states themselves. This can only be called total indifference to the grave concern of the international community over the risks of nuclear weapons. It is even more regrettable that some nuclear states have advanced the doctrine of nuclear response against non-nuclear threats thus further exacerbating an already alarming situation.

The NPT was never meant to perpetuate the possession of nuclear weapons and creates two categories of states. Such a reading of the non-proliferation regime will make it inherently unstable and invite further proliferation based on the misperception that acquisition of these deadly and inhumane weapons increase security or national clout.

At first glance, it might seem that there is no possibility for reconciliation between divergent positions on nuclear disarmament. But, we believe otherwise. As the threats associated with the unrealistic and dangerous insistence on maintaining the nuclear option become ever more evident, the international community will find ever more reason sooner or later, to enable the CD to commence serious negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We believe the self-evident reality is slowly sinking in that the advantages of a nuclear free world by far outweigh whatever prestige or misplaced sense of security that is derived from the balance of terror of nuclear arms race, old or new.

The President of the CD has been given the mandate to hold intensive consultations on agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament". We welcome this initiative and are of the view that this process should be dynamic and vigorous and pursued with the same enthusiasm by the incoming presidents. It should also provide for the early establishment of an ad-hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.

Transparency in Armaments

In the meantime, further decisive steps, including confidence-building measures might be considered in order to pave the ground for the realization of this ultimate objective. The CD, among other items, is to deliberate on transparency in armaments. This item includes transparency in nuclear armaments. Openness and transparency in this respect would promote confidence and stability and strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Similarly, it would facilitate negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty as well as any future progress on nuclear disarmament.

The General Assembly in its resolution 52/38 of 9 December 1997 on Transparency in Armaments has provided for transparency in weapons of mass destruction. Given the fact that under the CWC and BWC, the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons have been banned, the only missing ring in the chain of weapons of mass destruction is nuclear weapons. Therefore, the nuclear weapon states should be required to report on quantity and type of their nuclear arsenals, delivery systems, quantity and type of fissile materials, programs for quantitative and qualitative developments of nuclear weapons, and their activities in dismantling the existing nuclear warheads.

Negative Security Assurances

It is self-evident that the best assurance to non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of these inhumane weapons. However, as an interim measure and in line with the letter and spirit of the Declaration of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT as well as the decision of the CD at its first session, there exists the need to negotiate an international and legally binding instrument on NSA.

The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great importance to NSA, partially because States in the Middle East have not been able to establish a nuclear weapon free zone and benefit from its NSA advantages, due to the opposition by some nuclear state in support of Israel and its un-safeguarded nuclear activities and programs. In addition, granting of NSA has so far been selective in clear disregard for various international obligations.

For the NSA to be an effective instrument of the non-proliferation regime, it should be a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding instrument. The question of the providers of NSA, in light of recent developments, is a very sensitive and contentious issue that can wisely be deferred to the conclusion of negotiations on other provisions of the instrument. The recipients are obviously non-nuclear weapon parties to the NPT. We need not start from scratch. There are a good number of position papers by individual or group of countries. What is needed is political will and commitment on the part of nuclear weapon states to move forward.

The nuclear tests in South Asia also underscores the necessity of establishment of a zone free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Un-safeguarded nuclear facilities and clandestine nuclear programs of Israel pose an imminent threat to the peace and security of the region. A mistake should not be repeated twice. Hence, the international community should exert every pressure on Israel to immediately abandon and dismantle its nuclear weapon programs, accede without any precondition to the NPT and accept unconditionally the IAEA safeguards. Any thing less would but encourage Israel to continue enhancing its nuclear arsenal, which will undoubtedly have grave consequences for regional and global peace and security.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me stress that the time has come to transcend beyond shortsighted calculations of interest. We sincerely hope that the unfortunate incidents in South Asia would generate a strong momentum for multilateral negotiations on a phased program for nuclear disarmament so as to obviate the nuclear threats. Progress in this field requires persuasion, perseverance and pressure. The Conference on Disarmament has a historic opportunity and responsibility to generate these necessary prerequisites, while at the same time articulating pragmatic ideas to put them to best use.

Thank You, Mr. President.