Statement by H.E. Dr. Javad Zarif

At the CD

March 28, 2002

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Let me, at the outset, congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and wish you success in guiding the admittedly difficult task before us. My delegation has full confidence in your leadership and foresight to make every possible effort to steer the Conference on Disarmament back on track of relevance and importance which it once, not too long ego, enjoyed. I assure you of our support and cooperation.

I also wish to extend my warmest felicitations to my good friend, Sergei Ordzhonikidze on his appointment and wish him every success.

In the last few years we have witnessed drastic developments in international arena, not necessarily all promising in the field of international security and disarmament. The challenges have been formidable. Yet our resolve to face them has been less than desirable or truly collective.

The end of the cold war gave rise to hopes for a world free from superpower rivalries, a world where confrontation would no longer be the order of the day and cooperation would prevail, and a world where all states, through their active participation in multilateral processes addressing the problems facing the prosperity and well being of all nations, would devise rule-based regimes governing international relations in all spheres.

And we did in fact make undeniable progress in the field of disarmament, and this Conference can take credit for much of that. In the early 1990s, we succeeded in finalizing the Chemical Weapons Convention and establishing the OPCW to organize the international cooperation in our common cause against a horrible category of weapons of mass destruction.

In 1994, the BWC Special Conference mandated an open ended Ad Hoc Group to start negotiations on a protocol strengthening the implementation of the Convention to let the world feel more calm and safe from the scourge of another category of weapons of mass destruction.

In the 1990s, the Conference on Disarmament also engaged in negotiations for a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests, as a first step toward total elimination of nuclear weapons. Although the CD could not agree on a final document, the CTBT, in spite of deficiencies and loopholes, was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996.

In early 1995, nuclear-weapon states reaffirmed their pledge not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. This pledge was noted by the Security Council in its resolution 984. A couple of weeks later, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, taking note, inter alia, of this pledge, indefinitely extended the Treaty.

The 2000 NPT Review Conference was yet another success. The states parties to the Treaty could, for the first time after fifteen years, agree on a final document in which unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, applicability of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament and diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security posture were reaffirmed.

However, not all went well as hoped.

Following the end of negotiations on the CTBT, the Conference on Disarmament has failed to agree on a substantive program of work. It is in fact the fifth consecutive year that we gather in this august body to discuss what to discuss without any success.

The rejection of the CTBT by a major nuclear-weapon state has blown hopes for its rapid entry into force and there seems not to be any room for optimism towards a change of policy from that side.

The results of more than six years of negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group on a protocol strengthening the implementation of BWC has been vetoed and the validity of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group has been questioned. Furthermore, the BWC Fifth Review Conference has been suspended because of recourse to unilateral approach to issues of concern to all members of the international community.

The unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty coupled with the pursuit of gigantic military projects like the NMD have exacerbated international concerns about a more dangerous arms race and militarization of the outer space.

But that's not all yet.

Publication of excerpts from a new would be nuclear weapons doctrine has alarmed nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states alike. While the document remains classified, official statements do not deny that action plans are being devised to develop new generation of nuclear weapons and improve the existing ones to be used against nuclear as well as non-nuclear-weapon states.

“The Nuclear Posture Review” represents an alarming trend of contempt for multilateralism and threatens to undermine our common achievements, particularly in the area of non-proliferation.

We can not seek to establish a civilized community of human beings and States without accepting the premise that all peoples and States have an equal right to survive and to guarantee peace and security for their citizens. Mass destructive weapons by their very existence undermine this basic principle as well as the most fundamental human rights and the very foundations of international humanitarian law. We should not accept that our children in the coming millennium should continue to live under the horrifying shadow of possible use of these weapons. We must ensure that the people of Iran and Japan are the very last victims of weapons of mass destruction of any type at any time and under any pretext whatsoever.

At present, we feel that this very basic premise of civilized world is under attack of the "offensive strike leg" of the new nuclear posture.

As for Iran, let me underline once again and in no equivocal terms, that we consider the development and use of weapons of mass destruction inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our very basic principles. They have no place in our defense doctrine. We do not have, nor do we seek any such weapons, and most certainly we do not accept or tolerate allegations by those who have clearly placed themselves and their protégé outside the law.

Under such a volatile situation, where unacceptable unilateral approaches are even glorified, the United Nations Disarmament Machinery, and the Conference on Disarmament in particular, have a crucial role to play.

Nuclear Weapons

On nuclear weapons, the NPT and its review conferences provide us with sufficient input. Here the concern is more with compliance.

The emergence of the new nuclear weapons doctrine and its implications, constitute serious violation of the provisions of the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference on "moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions", "principle of irreversibility" and "diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies".

Such a doctrine would also constitute a grave violation of the positive and negative security assurances undertaken by nuclear-weapon states in the early 1980s and reaffirmed in 1995.

We believe that lack of compliance with commitments, undertaken according to NPT provisions and agreed upon during the NPT Review Conferences and those unilaterally pledged and reaffirmed, would make the option for a Treaty on Negative Security Assurances a viable one. The wealth of exploratory discussions within the Conference on Disarmament on this issue provides the necessary basis for strengthening the NPT regime through an international legally binding instrument assuring non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Biological Weapons

On Biological Weapons, the results of more than a decade of arduous negotiations within the VEREX and the Ad Hoc Group are too valuable to be neglected and put aside, just because of a single player, however powerful. We believe the only effective international mechanism to strengthen the BWC and combat new challenges, including bio-terrorism, is the finalization of the protocol through completion of the work of the 24th session of the Ad Hoc Group.

Strict adherence to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group, as issued by the 1994 BWC Special Conference would both assure the total and effective ban of another category of weapons of mass destruction and leave no ground for baseless allegations of non-compliance which lack any verifiable justification.

Chemical Weapons

The Chemical Weapons Convention is perhaps the only instrument dealing with weapons of mass destruction in which all necessary verification measures have been foreseen. In spite of deficiencies concerning universal adherence to the Convention, the OPCW has been successful in carrying out its task and continued full cooperation of all states parties is the prerequisite for its further success.

It is quite natural for all members of any international organization, including the OPCW, to be concerned with the management of all aspects of the work of the organization, including financial management and allocation of resources. However such concerns should be addressed through appropriate mechanisms envisaged, and not through arms-twisting or financially strangulating the only legitimate mechanism to verify compliance with the Convention.

Missiles

The complexities associated with the issue of missiles are so enormous that no unilateral, self serving approach could avail a universal response which takes into account the interests and concerns of all. The results of the work of the Panel of Governmental Experts and the report to be submitted to the General Assembly would provide us with a road map to deal with the issue. We, therefore, believe that every support should be rendered, through active participation in a truly deliberative process within the panel, in order to allow this first step adopted in the framework of the United Nations be conducive to broad-based conclusions.

It is necessary to keep the issue of missiles, in all its aspects and in a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and balanced manner, within the United Nations disarmament machinery which provides the sole multilateral forum to address arms control and disarmament issues.

Mr. President,

While the international community calls for multilateralism, cooperation and dialogue, one single voice talks about the escalation of war and unilateralism. The international community is standing at a defining moment. We need to decide about our individual and collective approaches. We had thought and hoped that all players had reached the maturity to understand that self-centered policies that are “quite simply pro” this or that country are indeed quite simply outdated. We need to build policies that are pro-humanity. It is not that simple, and admittedly not that popular with some powerful domestic constituencies. But it is most certainly the only way.

Three years ago, I stated before this august body that:

As we enter a new millennium, we need to adopt a new perspective. We need to revisit old strategies and doctrines, which were founded in theoretically weak and historically unsound constructs…. The challenge of the twenty first century is…the mentality that believes any country, whatsoever, still needs [nuclear weapons] or can justify having them or claim that they are safe in their arsenal.

Doctrines and policies of arms race, block formations and exclusions have not brought our global community any real sense of security or peace. We need to rethink these very policies and reassess our fundamental assumptions; and I regret that this is yet to happen. Before a new round of rivalry and exclusion is entrenched, perpetuated and sanctified through the theories of clash and conflict between nations and even civilizations, the international community must adopt the strategy of dialogue, tolerance and inclusion. The Conference on Disarmament’s mission for the 21^st century must center on an active pursuit of this imperative, breaking away with outdated perspectives and beginning to look seriously at new paradigms such as Global Security Networking.

Today, I can repeat the same statement with even more vigor and commitment. The tragic events of September 11^th proved beyond a shadow of doubt that we all have one fundamental commonality: our common vulnerability. The horror of that day illustrated that no country, however powerful, can be immune from the menaces that threaten the rest of the international community. It showed that global problems ranging from terrorism to environment, to weapons of mass destruction require global and not unilateral responses. Failure to grasp this reality would lead to simplistic and domestically appealing statements of policy such as some that have been made in this hall.

Lets us have no doubt that sooner or later, we will all come to the conclusion that we require a new global security paradigm founded on the principle that security is global and indivisible. We will save ourselves and the entire humanity a great deal of energy and agony by coming to terms, sooner rather than later, with the real need for inclusive, multilateral and rule-based security for all. For that we need to expand our horizons. We need to go beyond national self-interest to global common interest. The Conference on Disarmament has a crucial role to play in this endeavor and has the capacity to do so and thus lead.