Dr. M. Javad Zarif[1]
The Chemical Weapons Convention, as a unique disarmament treaty aiming at
eliminating a complete category of weapons of mass destruction under strict and
effective international control, represents an achievement of historic
proportions in the field of disarmament. States Parties to the Convention have
committed themselves to implement a vast range of obligations in order to
ensure the effective attainment of the Convention’s goals. Through comprehensive
implementation of the Convention, there is great hope and expectation that the
future generations will be spared from the immense suffering and horror that so
many victims of chemical warfare have endured during the Twentieth century.
The people of
The CWC has now
141 States Parties on board. By acceding to the Convention, the States Parties
commit themselves to declare all their relevant chemical activities and
facilities; to destroy their chemical weapons and their production facilities;
to refrain from use of chemical weapons, and not to encourage nor assist anyone
to engage in any activity prohibited under the
Convention.
Moreover, the States Parties are obliged “not [to]
maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any
international agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under
this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the development and
promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry
for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other
peaceful purposes”[2]
It is self evident that the credibility
and efficacy of the convention thoroughly depends on the full and
non-discriminatory implementation of all its provisions. The only
discriminatory approach that the Convention entails is towards the non States
Parties. It clearly draws a line between those who have committed themselves to
comply with the Convention by joining it and those who have preferred to stay
outside of its purview. The Convention provides that schedule 1 and 2 chemicals
cannot be transferred to States not party to the Convention.[3]
It means that a very vast range of chemicals, most of them necessary for
chemical industries producing goods for every day’s life, would be deleted from
importing/exporting lists of non-States Parties. These sanctions have been
drafted to ensure that being out of the Convention would be extremely difficult
and indeed prohibitive.
At the same time, the Convention has
assured the States Parties that their economic and technological development
for peaceful purposed would not be hampered by implementing the obligations
under the Convention. This assurance is of utmost importance since
international cooperation in chemical trade and technology for peaceful
purposes is a very compelling incentive for accession. It further encourages
State Parties, especially developing countries, to stay on board and meet their
obligations. Failure to fulfill this assurance through removing impediments for
economic and technological development of States Parties would irreparably
impair the integrity and relevance of the Convention.
The issue of economic and
technological development and access for peaceful purposes are of such
importance that all major disarmament treaties have mandatory provisions
requiring States Parties to cooperate in peaceful access to material and
technology. Article XI of the CWC provides clear assurances and commitments on
this issue, addressing very clearly stated concerns of developing countries in
the field of economic and technological development. Regrettably, the
implementation of Article XI is facing major challenges.
Article XI, as
one of the main pillars of the Convention, needs a
concrete, operational and action-oriented procedure similar to those envisaged
for other provisions of the Convention. In this procedure the role of the Executive
Council, the Conference of States Parties, the Technical Secretariat and
obligations and rights of States Parties should clearly be defined.
Article XI, as it stands, establishes a general principle on how States
Parties should frame their national policies in the field of chemical
cooperation and activities, and how the Organization should implement
verification procedures. Despite this clarity, there continues to be some
national tendencies as well as certain export control regimes, which violate and
undermine the letter and spirit of Article XI.
It is notable that the export
control regimes outside the Convention continue to be applied despite the
clearly stated commitment made in 1992 that the restrictions placed by the
Australia Group would be dismantled once the Convention became operational.[4]
The Director-General of the OPCW, in his address to the Forth Session of
the Conference of the State Parties, has made a very pertinent observation in
this regard. He stated:
As the Convention contains its
own in-house export control regime, it becomes increasingly difficult, after
entry into force, to justify the continuing application of ad-hoc export
control regimes to state parties to the Convention… A prolonged continuation of
the current situation can only damage the Convention and its long-term goal,
which we have all pledged ourselves to support.
It does not seem that the proponents
of ad-hoc export control regimes are not really convinced of the effectiveness
of the Organization’s in-house export control mechanism. If such was the case, it would have been
appropriate to address the issue in the proper framework of the Conference of
the States Parties in order to address the deficiencies and find solutions to
make the Convention and Organization stronger.
It is evident that those who are
supporting and applying export control regimes outside the Convention indeed
attempt to maintain unilateral, non-transparent and politically-oriented
mechanisms which instead of adding more credibility to the Convention tend to
serve their national political priorities.
A clear illustration of the political
agenda of the export control regimes can be detected in their targets. While
certain non-parties to the Convention, with proven chemical weapons capabilities,
have remained immune from these export control regimes, their restrictions
continue to be applied against States Parties who have scrupulously complied
with the Convention. This practice, as the Director-General has correctly
stated, damages the very credibility of the Convention and its goal and object.
The
verification regime of the Convention applied by the well equipped and
well-prepared Organization is and should be the exclusive tool for verifying
compliance. The Convention has provided the States Parties with opportunity and
instruments to raise, in a logical and rule-based fashion, their concerns over
any possible non-compliance of other Parties. Various categories of inspection
envisaged in the Convention have established an effective mechanism through
which the successful implementation of the Convention would be ensured.
Therefore, all efforts should be
directed at ensuring universality of the Convention by faithfully enforcing
disincentives for non-members, while at the same time complying with the
incentives provided to those who have already joined. Failure to implement Article XI with regard
to States Parties not only has no justification whatsoever and constitutes
flagrant non-compliance, but also impedes the much needed universality of the
Convention. It is therefore detrimental
to the Convention and the global regime it intends to establish.
In order to
avoid further erosion of the credibility and relevance of the Convention, it is
imperative to devise a rule-based and institutionalized approach to the
implementation of Article XI. In this
context, the Iranian delegation has proposed the establishment of a
“Cooperation Committee” as a policy making subsidiary organ to envisage the
necessary requirements for the implementation of the Article, while providing a
dispute-settlement mechanism regarding compliance with its provisions. The
Committee, whose terms of reference and procedures should be elaborated by the
States Parties, would contribute to the efforts of the Organization to develop
a framework for activities aimed at promoting scientific and technological
cooperation for peaceful purposes, assisting the States Parties in adoption of
specific measures to avoid hampering the socio-economic development of other
States Parties.
[1]
Dr. Zarif has been Deputy Foreign Minister for International and Legal Affairs
of the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1992.
He has held various positions at the United Nations, the Non-Aligned
Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. His international responsibilities include
Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 2000 and Chairman of
the Sixth (legal) Committee of the General Assembly in 1992. Dr. Zarif holds a Ph.D. in international law
and politics from University of Denver.
In addition to his diplomatic responsibilities, he teaches international
law and multilateral diplomacy at University of Tehran, and is the author of
numerous articles on disarmament, human rights and regional issues.
[2]
The CWC, Article XI, subparagraph
2(c ).
[3]
Even on transferring
schedule 3 chemicals to States not party to the Convention, “ each State Party
shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the transferred chemical
shall only be used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.”
[4]
See: Report of the Ad-hoc
Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament, CD/1170(1992).